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Longing, Belonging and the Politics of Naming: The Case 
of the Khache
Anisa Bhutia
In Tibet, Muslim traders and subsequent 
settlers from Kashmir were called Khache. 
Over the years, this term has come to acquire 
multiple significations. By engaging with the 
complex history of the group and their eventual 
return to Kashmir, this paper tries to uncover 
these very significations and how the idea 
of Khache represents a coming together of 
the Himalayan region (Tibet, Nepal, Kashmir, 
Darjeeling, Kalimpong). In their multi-layered 
notion of belonging, there is a strong sense of 
attachment to the imagined Tibet, reflecting 
a harmoniously lived life, while further 
complexities emerge from their repatriation 
to the ancestral land of Kashmir. Referred to 
as Kashmiri Muslims (loosely, Khache) in Tibet, 
and now as Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir, the 
confusion in identity is as much linguistic as 
political. We should also note that regional 
prefixes such as ‘Tibetan’ or ‘Kashmiri’ do not 
just fixate associations with regions, but also 
with regimes of power and powerful agents. 
As such, through this article I am trying to 
argue for a geographically and politically 
neutral or at least less problematic term, 
Khache. Finally, this paper is an ethnographic 
examination of how different representations 
and regional influences can be witnessed in 
everyday life performances for this group, 
and how these ultimately shape their sense 
of being. In the same vein, we will locate 
Islam emerging as a constant and source of 
justification to life’s trials and tribulations— 
as often portrayed by the analogy to hijrat— 
the journey to save one’s religion.
Keywords: Khache, region, religion, belonging, Islam, Tibet.
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Introduction
Friend: Happy Losar, Anisa.
Me: Thank you, same to you. 
Suddenly I turn and ask: Why did you wish me a happy Losar? 
Friend: Aren’t you Tibetan Muslim?
Me: Yes I am. But I don’t celebrate Losar. I celebrate Eid. 
The above encounter was with a friend in the year 2000 
when I was attending school in Kalimpong. Even as a child, 
the assumption that I would celebrate Losar, a Buddhist 
new year festival associated with the first day of the 
lunisolar Tibetan calendar, was something that discom-
forted me. The prefix Tibetan had always been a part of 
my identity and my answer to the question ‘who are you’ 
had always been: Tibetan Muslim, almost like an instant 
reflex. Eid was the only festival that my family celebrated, 
but I knew about Losar due to the large Tibetan Buddhist 
settlements in Kalimpong. The uneasiness of the conver-
sation with my friend and the need to further clarify what 
I meant at that time as a child has become a more complex 
process of deconstruction of identity in the years that 
have followed.
  * * *
This article tries to argue that it is critical to engage with 
how we name a group or community, by elaborating the 
case of the so-called ‘Tibetan Muslims’ who settled in 
Kashmir. Indeed, for such a people who have moved back 
and forth over regions (Kashmir-Tibet-Kashmir) and have 
a complex sense of history and identity, I argue that there 
should be an attempt to avoid spatially-fixating catego-
ries, as it poses problems like those which I will discuss 
as the paper proceeds. We should also note that regional 
prefixes such as ‘Tibetan’ or ‘Kashmiri’ do not just fixate 
associations with regions, but also with regimes of power 
and powerful agents. As such, through this article I am 
trying to argue for a geographically and politically neutral 
or at least less problematic term Khache. I believe this term 
absorbs the complex historicity, identity of movement, 
and the different relationalities of space and time that the 
above-mentioned community has lived. In this way I am 
also trying to challenge the idea of regions as politically 
and cartographically formed alone. Rather, I argue that 
they are also formed through the complex mobility of 
people and their social and cultural practices. 
The journey for this research began in 2012 with my 
master’s dissertation in cultural studies; I started to crit-
ically engage with the community’s history and identity. 
Since then, numerous visits to Kalimpong, Dharamshala 
and Kashmir have helped me gain insights about how these 
groups of people are held together or not. Many instances 
outlined in the following sections made me question as 
to how and whether at all, one could call this group a 
community. I realised during fieldwork that, though being 
spatially dispersed, there is a strong feeling of community 
among the members of the group. Kalimpong, Darjeeling, 
Srinagar, Ladakh, Nepal, and even Saudi Arabia and Turkey 
are some of the areas which they now call home, besides 
of course, Central Tibet, still, for some (Shah 2012: 51, 59; 
Altner 2010: 70; Rai 2010; Butt 1994: 16). Despite all these 
different locations, there seems to be a sense of solidarity 
among all the ‘Tibetan Muslims’ having an intertwined 
history with different regions of Tibet, Kashmir, and many 
others. At present, the most significant population of the 
group is settled in Srinagar, in Eidgah and Hawal Colonies, 
the two spaces which I frequented during my stay in 
Kashmir. It is important to note here that the situations for 
the Khache located in other parts of the world might not 
be similar to the ones that I encountered in Srinagar. The 
arguments in this article are based in my fieldwork in 2015 
and the descriptions are locally situated in the politics of 
Kashmir at that time. 
Based on an ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the year 
2015 over a span of six months, the data were primarily 
obtained through participant observation and in-depth 
interviews with members of my community. During my 
fieldwork, I saw the complications that the movement has 
brought for this group in Kashmir. They formed their sense 
of belonging to either being a Tibetan, or Kashmiri, and 
most commonly, a Muslim. Amidst the many differences, 
one of the few commonalities that the group in Srinagar 
stands united for is the term Khache; as, when and how this 
very term gets translated, so do their politics. By intro-
ducing the term Khache to the academic discourse instead 
of ‘Tibetan Muslims’, I do not mean to say these people 
are not Tibetan. Rather, it is an attempt to underscore the 
point that Tibetan cultural habits—specifically language, 
food, dress, and also common nostalgia—may as well 
apply to people who follow the religion of Islam (i.e. not 
just Buddhism), people who may have more complicated 
histories and stories of movement. Additionally, till date, 
there has been no debate or discussions as to when the 
term ‘Tibetan Muslim’ came to be used. Is Tibetan Muslim 
a direct translation of the term Khache? These are some 
questions that need a more in-depth examination than just 
the history of the community. With the deconstruction 
and symbolic investigation of the term, I am hoping to 
intervene in the academic process of naming communities. 
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Probably, it can also be looked as a way of rethinking the 
different categories that this group presents—Tibetan, 
Muslim, and Kashmiri.
Khache: Understanding, Engaging, and Exploring the 
Meanings
My enquiry to understand the names used for Muslims in 
Tibet during my fieldwork in Kashmir attracted diverse 
responses. Most of the common iterations were Lhasa 
Khache or Singpa Khache. A closer examination of the term 
with my respondents on the meaning of Khache revealed 
other purposes that this word contained. Tibetan ka means 
big, and che implies mouth, translating to a ‘talkative 
person’. As the Khache were traders and consequently, 
extensive travelers, they had a lot of stories to share with 
the natives of Tibet; according to my analysis of the term 
it might be possible that they were considered particularly 
talkative or boastful. Further, Khache can be described as 
the Kashmiris of Lhasa, who came from Kashmir either 
directly, or via Ladakh. The term is also attributed to have 
its origin in the Persian word khwaja used for a respectable 
man, a wealthy merchant (Gaborieau 1995: 21). Thus, in the 
dominant discourse Khache primarily refers to the people 
who came from Kashmir.
In Tibetan there are many terms, which represent the 
Islamic Empire or its people. “The most important ones are 
stag gzig, par sig, khrom/phrom and kha che” (Akasoy, Burnett, 
and Yoeli-Tlalim 2011: 2-3). All these terms are highly 
contested and do not have only one singular meaning and 
they were discovered at the beginning of the twentieth 
century from the Mogao caves at Dunhuang (ibid). In the 
Dunhuang manuscript,1 in the ninth century there was a 
mention of ‘Kha che’ silk but whether it meant ‘Kashmiri’ 
or ‘Muslim’ in general is not clear (ibid: 4). Some scholars 
have shown that Muslims from northern India and Nepal 
were also called Khache (Jest 1995: 8). But who the Khache 
are still remains a question. One of my respondents has 
noted, “some people came from Kashmir to Tibet to preach 
Buddhism, they also had a prefix of Khache to their name.” 
The term perhaps, meant to refer to people who were from 
Kashmir but coincidently, the Kashmiris who visited Tibet 
were mostly Muslims. Hence, in due course of time, Khache 
became synonymous with Kashmiri Muslims. Further, it 
has been legitimized due to the everyday vocabulary of 
the people. But it is important to note here that Khache is a 
subjective term, whose meaning might differ from people 
to people, from period to period.
Moving on to the word Khache’s many associations in 
central Tibet’s society and culture, there are records of 
the presence of the term in Tibet since the Fifth Dalai 
Lama (1617-1682). It is believed that it was the Fifth Dalai 
Lama who granted them land to build a mosque and a 
cemetery (Bhutia 2016: 03; Prince Peter of Greece and 
Denmark 2011: 238; Butt 2005; Jest 1995: 8). The Khache 
ling-ka—the Garden of the Kashmiri—is deemed to be 
where the first mosque was built in Tibet (Jest 1995: 8, 
Altner 2010: 66). Various Muslim communities had settled 
in Tibet, and the most prominent among them were the 
Hui and the Khache. Altner (2011: 346) argues that Muslims 
in Chinese are called as Keshe, and Khache is perhaps a 
derivative of the term. Muslims were actively involved 
in society and even contributed to the Tibetan economy, 
culture and literature (Singh 2015: 8, Altner 2010: 67- 
68). The nangma, a high-pitched lilting song, is believed 
to have been developed by the Muslims of Tibet. Some 
scholars believe that it has its origins in the Urdu word 
naghma which means melody (Geoffrey, n.d: 13-19). Even 
this claim is contested, as some believe that the Tibetans 
generated it. Mr. Lobsang Samten, Senior Art Director of 
the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts opined that, “If 
we look at the history, the people who performed in the 
court in the early days were Tibetan Muslims. Therefore, 
I believe there is a relation between nangma and naghma.” 
He named some of the nangma singers like Irfanlah 
Rehman and the first nangma singer named Yishi, who 
were ethnically Khache. Another important contribution 
of the Khache has been on the literature front through 
a scripture titled - “Khache Phalu’s Advice on the art of 
living” (Khache Phalu’s 1987). Though there are contesta-
tions on its authorship, it is a book that is known to most 
Tibetan households. It was initially written in the Tibetan 
script and Professor Dawa Norbu, credited for the English 
translation of the book, also believes that it was written 
by a Khache person. The word Khache, thus, embraces 
Tibetan-ness without having to spell it out as such, while 
also maintaining its distinct (and mysterious) character. 
The word Khache opens up possibilities for trans-regional 
representation and affective dimensions.
Khache and the Ummah: Coming Together of Regions
Before the 1950s in Tibet, there was no requirement of 
choosing a nationality and the idea of citizenship had 
not developed. Traders and travelers “moved as easily 
between identities as one did through the mountain 
passes” (Khan 2015: 66). As such, the trading communities 
such as the Khache, by their movement and settlement 
were already bringing various regions together into 
new geographies by their socio-cultural, narrative, and 
affective practices. History for this region is, thus, also 
connected. It is important to note that regions should 
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not be seen as something artificial but as an active agent 
shaping the social, economic and political processes of 
the world (Scargill 1985: 139). Further, regions are formed 
through its networks, relations and connections (Allen 
and Cochrane 2007: 1162). 
In case of the Khache the complex historicity and geog-
raphy that had formed around the community through 
their movements got further complicated after the Chinese 
invasion of Tibet after 1950s. Freedom of religion being 
taken away, many people moved from Tibet to other 
areas. The Khache in particular again had to move, this 
time towards ‘their ancestral place of Kashmir’. On the 
route from Tibet to Kashmir, they stopped in the eastern 
Himalayan town of Kalimpong for around six months 
during the 1960s before moving on. The relocation to 
Kashmir was decided by the Poonj/Panch (five) committee,2 
a group formed during the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama 
to take care of the administrative affairs of the Muslims 
in Tibet (Singh 2015: 05; Naik 1995: 32; Butt 1994). Most 
of the members of the community settled in Kashmir but 
some came back to the Himalayan towns of Kalimpong and 
Darjeeling in the Indian state of West Bengal; a sizeable 
number also went to Nepal. In this way, the Khache spread 
throughout the Himalayan belt. A group whose history 
was primarily formed by the trade routes of the Himalayan 
regions ultimately spread out again into all these different 
regions. Although the majority of the Khache have relo-
cated to Srinagar, there may be some in other parts of the 
world as well. Like in the past, this group has settled and 
taken certain traits from the local culture and created 
an almost peculiar way of living that spans across the 
Himalaya from Tibet to Nepal and beyond, thus bringing 
together multiple regions. 
The stories of movement, place making and relocation, 
which shaped the Khache’s identity, makes the history 
of the group a deeply connected one spanning across 
different time, space, and regimes. These connections have 
shaped the community’s sense of belonging and have been 
sustained and performed in different forms even today. A 
member of the group in Kalimpong would be well aware 
about what is happening in Kashmir. Similarly, the people 
in Kashmir would know about the Khache’s in Nepal and 
these connections span further to Dubai, Tibet, Turkey, 
and many other places, some of which I am probably not 
even aware of. “We Tibetan Muslims have relatives all 
over. We still have family in Lhasa, Ladakh, Kashmir, and 
in Kalimpong and Darjeeling. It is only geographically that 
we are apart; otherwise we are all the same, culturally 
and religiously” (Sherpa 2018). Having similar sentiments, 
some of my respondents in Kashmir mentioned, “Now due 
to strict rules and regulations from the Chinese govern-
ment, it is difficult for us to contact our people in Tibet 
easily. Still whenever we get a chance we try to call and 
talk even if it is only for 30 seconds or so.” The 30 second 
call then becomes the talking point amidst all the members 
of the group, almost acting like a shared connectivity for 
the community as a whole. 
This shared connectivity gets mobilized through enact-
ments of different functions, conversations, foods, dress, 
language, which create a sense of solidarity. During 
weddings one can see women wearing chuba (Tibetan 
dress), covering their heads with scarf and wearing ghau 
(necklace). One can almost sense the feeling of pride while 
my respondents reflected on their connected histories. All 
these are different forms of an intentional creation of a 
collective ummah (community) across different geograph-
ical and political borders which gets problematized when 
we try to fix them with a certain national categorization 
like ‘Tibetan’ or ‘Kashmiri’. Since the early twentieth 
century, both these regions (Tibet and Kashmir) have 
experienced complex contentions, which have shaped 
their respective trajectories. To categorize the Khache as 
either ‘Tibetan or Kashmiri’, further confuses and compli-
cates their already complex historicity. Also, to categorize 
them with these national prefixes denies their intention-
ality and agency to enact a transnational existence. This 
reminds us of Schneiderman’s (2010: 292) discussion of the 
Thangmi performing multi-agent negotiations and cross 
border existences while also remaining ‘ungoverned’. Like 
the Thangmi, we probably need a term that can accommo-
date both intentionality and agency. I suggest Khache could 
be one such term.  
Messy States: Khache and the Fatigue of Being In-
Between
The group has been represented differently over time by 
agents in various positions of power, privilege, and access 
to knowledge. Some of my own early stepping-stones in 
researching the community have been through works of 
high scholarly value, contributed by well-meaning scholars 
to whom I remain eternally grateful. But their represen-
tation of the community, that had once seemed innocent, 
started to register as highly problematic once I was in 
Kashmir, talking to my respondents. In the following 
subsection, I will try to show how. Furthermore, engaging 
with the highly negotiated relocation of the group to India, 
we will come across some more representations made by 
state agents during the process, which reveal a deeper 
geopolitical power play. The rehabilitation in Jammu and 
Kashmir state was not smooth and simple either. As such I 
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will discuss the contentious topic of ‘Jammu and Kashmir 
state subjectship’, and the discordant and often-contra-
dictory language of representation and action towards 
the resettled community by the federal and central state 
agents themselves. This excavates the messiness of central 
and state-unity bringing forth the nested complications of 
Jammu and Kashmir region’s politics.
Scholarly Representations 
One of the first works on the Khache was by Marc 
Gaborieau, called Récit d’un voyageur Mussulman au Tibet 
(Story of a Muslim traveler in Tibet) (Muhammad 1973), 
written in French, primarily a travelogue of Ghulam 
Muhammad. Gaborieau also wrote the introduction to the 
special issue of the Tibet Journal (1995), published by the 
Library of Tibetan Work and Archives, Dharamshala, on 
‘Tibetan Muslims’. Here he defines the Tibetan Muslims 
as any Muslims who ‘are in some way or other connected 
with Tibet’, irrespective of whether they live in Tibet 
proper or outside. According to this definition, the Muslim 
settlers in Srinagar may be called Tibetan Muslims. A 
similar view is put forward by David Atwill (2016) who 
focuses on their Tibetan heritage and history of living in 
Lhasa ‘for generations’. In effect, such lingering nostalgia 
of the lived life in Tibet also pervades their everyday, as I 
encountered and elaborate in the ensuing sections. But the 
romantic view of the Muslim as harmoniously and happily 
embedded in local Tibetan society is problematized and 
challenged by Andrew Fischer (2005). Siddiqui (1991) and 
Sheikh (1991) present a compact idea of the history of 
this group of people before 1959 and there-after. Another 
important reference is the book Tibet and Tibetan Muslim 
(2004) written originally in Urdu by Amir Ud-din Nadwi, 
who is a member of the community, still living in Srinagar 
but not in the ‘Tibetan Colonies’, the place where they 
(Khache) are located at present in Srinagar, Kashmir. 
The definition of ‘Tibetan Muslim’ given by Gaborieau 
(1995: 3) has a nostalgic sense of rootedness in Tibet. But 
it does not question the complications of citizenship and 
belonging that the contemporary period brings forth 
for such transnational groups. In my understanding, 
the term ‘Tibetan’ Muslim, might suggest a peaceful 
Shangri-la—accommodative of the different religion in 
Tibet—may hold value, sentimental or otherwise, for 
the one who represents. But the same prefix takes on a 
completely different meaning when it travels to other 
regions and regimes such as Kashmir, together with the 
people represented as such. In the local Kashmiri context, 
the term applied to the settler in their colonies takes 
on a different connotation and trajectory altogether, 
suggesting a different identity (‘outsiders’) and belonging. 
This complicates their integration within a society and 
territory that they claim and value as their ancestral land, 
and leads to a fragmented community life, as I will later 
explain. At this point, it will not be unfair to reflect, with 
care, on the process of naming, the privileges, interests, 
and even limitations of the ones who name (this surely 
includes me and members of the community who project 
particular representations that I will elaborate below), the 
claims that we, as scholars, make, and thus, to meditate 
on the messy afterlives of our own representations and 
produced knowledge.
The frequent visit of scholars questioning and their incon-
venient categorization has made my respondents wary. 
During our free-flowing conversation, one of my respon-
dents mentioned, “We are only answering you because 
you are one of us and look like us, we are fed up with the 
questions from researchers and everyone else that wants 
to know our history.” Another respondent further height-
ened this fatigued spirit, almost getting irritated when I 
mentioned I am working on Tibetan Muslims. He retorted, 
“There are no Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir; if you want to 
study the Tibetan Muslims, you need to go to Tibet.” When 
I first went into the field, like the aforementioned scholars, 
I had similar idealized notions of a cherished Tibet being 
lived in a harmonious community life in Srinagar. But such 
testimonies were the first jolts, which made me realize 
the underlying tensions and deeply-rooted complications 
that this community was negotiating in Kashmir. I further 
realized that the politics of identity and names resulted 
in fragments within the community, confusion regarding 
state subjectship, local popular perceptions of the Khache 
as outsiders even in their believed ancestral place. It 
further translated into real everyday problems such as 
restricted access to higher education, lack of employment, 
and restrictions on buying land. Let me turn to a more 
elaborate discussion about this in the following sections. 
Ambiguity of Governance: White Papers and State 
Subject
“India’s Traders Held by Chinese”, 3 read an article in 
August 1959 in the New York Times in the backdrop of 
a very animated dialogue between the Indian and the 
Chinese governments. These negotiations centered 
around the 129 families of Muslim settlers in Tibet, who 
were eventually relocated by the Indian Government and 
given shelter in Srinagar. One of the most critical docu-
ments that record these negotiations is a series of notes, 
letters, and memoranda collectively called the White 
Papers I and II (1959). 
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An examination of the White Papers reveals an important 
dialogue between the two emerging regional powers, 
trying to assert themselves geopolitically. Both the 
governments of China and India tried to claim the status of 
the group being either Tibetan or Kashmiri, respectively, 
their respective interest being deftly embedded in the 
language and names they employed. The category that the 
Indian state used was ‘Muslims of Indian Origin Residing at 
Lhasa and Other Places of Tibet for Trade Purpose’, while 
the Chinese negotiators claimed that they were ‘Tibetan 
people of the People’s Republic of China, living under the 
local administration for generations’. This was a crucial 
geopolitical moment, indeed. It was Nehru’s administra-
tion that finally clinched the negotiation, allowing them 
to relocate and arranged for their rehabilitation in ‘the 
valley of Kashmir’. Many of my respondents opined that it 
was the time of “hindi chini, bhai bhai [India and China are 
like brothers]”—two new neighboring republics founded 
on left-leaning ideals, seeking mutual co-operation) and 
they were hence brought back to their ‘ancestral land of 
Kashmir’. It may be fruitful to remember, at this stage, 
that since the first half of the twentieth century, Kashmir, 
being in a strategic geopolitical location in between 
Central and South Asia has been embroiled in a peculiar 
and bitter conflict between various contending parties 
including India, China, and Pakistan (Guha 2008). By 
claiming the Khache as ‘Indian Citizens’ through the narra-
tive of their ‘Kashmiri ancestry’ and by China agreeing, 
the Khache’s ‘repatriation’ may be interpreted as a geopo-
litical attempt by the Indian state in its process to claim 
Kashmir as part of India conclusively, that is, through 
international bureaucracy and documents. Indeed, the 
repatriation allowed these Muslim families to escape reli-
gious repression, like many of my respondents mentioned, 
and provided the community with documentary claim of 
ancestry and rehabilitation in Kashmir, validated by the 
Indian central state. But at the same time, we note how, 
through these bureaucratic negotiations, the history, 
identity, and destiny of these Khache families were being 
(re)drawn and negotiated, through evolving categories.
In these notes and letters exchanges the term Khache/
Kachi got systematically translated as Kashmiri Muslims 
in the realm of the central Indian Government.4 As these 
families of ‘Kashmiri Muslims’ were escorted into India 
and provided with Indian citizenship, they were subse-
quently allocated some land (first in Eidgah then in the 
Hawal neighborhood) in Srinagar, under a lease with the 
promise of ownership transfer after 20 years. In the public 
documents issued by the Jammu and Kashmir government, 
however, we encounter the significant addition of ‘Tibetan 
Refugees’, after the Indian state-prescribed term ‘Kashmiri 
Muslims’. Further, while the Jammu and Kashmir civil 
secretary’s plot allotment sanction for rehabilitation in 
Sangeen Darwaza, Hawal read ‘Kashmiri Muslim Tibetan 
Refugees’, the public hoarding of the site for the housing 
colony eliminated the term ‘Kashmiri Muslim’ altogether 
with a declaration in bold, ‘SITE FOR HOUSING COLONY OF 
TIBETIAN REFUGEES, J&K Housing Board’(sic). In fact, even 
today, these neighborhoods that they are settled in, are 
locally referred to as the ‘Tibetan Refugee Colony’. There is 
a predominant popular perception of them being Tibetan 
and their colonies regarded as the places where one can 
get momos (dumplings). The resulting situation, as the 
reader would imagine, is one of tension and confusion.
Another important site of such contestation is the ques-
tion of the ‘Jammu and Kashmir State Subjectship’, which 
results from Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomous 
status within the Indian Constitution. It is an exclusive 
political identity, also called Permanent Residency, 
which grants people of the Jammu and Kashmir state the 
ownership of lands, access to higher education, jobs, and 
other such state privileges and has come to be regarded 
as proof for ancestry and origin. It is worthwhile at this 
stage, to emphasize the thorny relations between Jammu 
and Kashmir state and the Indian central government as it 
has evolved over decades of war, violence, and increasing 
surveillance and control. The volatility of the political 
situation and the underlying tension between regimes 
surfaces frequently in the everyday working of bureau-
cracy and government, as was apparent in the discordant 
language-use in the case of housing and rehabilitation that 
we just encountered. 
The question of state subjectship heightens the politics of 
belonging for communities like these relocated Muslims 
from Tibet, whose ancestry cannot be easily established. 
On the one hand there is the White Paper, issued by the 
central India state, which confirms their Kashmiri ancestry 
and supports their claim to being regarded as Kashmiri. 
On the other, most of them lack Kashmiri State subject 
papers, which makes their territorial belonging dubious 
and vulnerable before local state authorities (Bhutia 2017). 
The problem then, is one of authority and legitimacy of 
the right to affirm ancestry and belonging, and lies at 
the core of the evolving relations between the local and 
central governments claiming stake in Kashmir. Let us 
consider the case in 2014, when the names of members 
of the community were suddenly struck down from the 
local voter’s list by the area’s election authority, on the 
grounds of non-possession of state subject papers. It came 
as a rude shock to many of my respondents as they and 
their ancestors had been casting votes since 1960s, I was 
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told. It was only after several rounds of explanation from 
several members and showing of earlier voters’ lists and 
Indian nationality documents, that the voting rights were 
re-instated again by the officer. Similar confusion occurs 
also with the subject of the buying of land and property, 
applying for higher education, seeking employment in 
public offices, etc. Needless to say, this severely restricts 
social and economic mobility, and limits options to 
improve livelihoods (Shah 2012: 62). 
Further, another such incident which shows the uncertain 
conditions that the group is living has been mentioned 
below, where one person from the community had gone to 
register for a ration card:
The authority who was issuing the Ration Card was 
from Ladakh. Being a Ladakhi, he knows that the 
Tibetans do not have state subject. He refused the 
application of the Tibetans on the grounds of them 
not being a State Subject... Technically speaking we 
do not have any rights whatsoever if it comes to 
us for staying here. Right now because they don’t 
know about us so somehow we get by. Somehow 
we manage. Some of the students get admissions in 
the university to study, sometimes they ask for the 
state subject, and as we do not have that they show 
the ration card. If a person applies the law we do 
not have any verification. (Pervez Sheikh, 45, Male, 
Hawal, 16th September 2015)5 
Like the issue of ration cards, another such incident took 
place in the late 1990s; when some community members 
were denied passports. Narrating the incident, one of 
the respondents, who lives near the colony mentioned, 
“In order to separate us from the other Tibetans who are 
refugees, the government had to do a survey to clarify the 
descendants of the heads of the family mentioned in the 
white paper, in order to be sure that they were handing 
the passport to the right people.” 
Further, there are continuous interactions with the 
Tibetan Government in Exile, formally called as Central 
Tibetan Administration (CTA) through the visits by the 
Dalai Lama to the Eidgah and Hawal colonies, and the 
presence of local institutions like the Tibetan Public 
School, Men tsee-khang (the Tibetan Medicine Institute, 
established in the form of a small shop in the local vicinity 
of the colony). Thus, apart from the above-mentioned 
categories, such interactions and engagement with 
CTA create an additional set of representations for this 
group of people. As many of my respondents hold dear 
the statement from the earlier visits of the Dalai Lama, 
“When Tibet gets free, we shall all return to Tibet.” These 
encounters uphold the Tibetan belonging to the commu-
nity, which gets reproduced in their everyday lives. One 
of the most important visible representations of being a 
Tibetan is the Tibetan Public School located in the Hawal 
area within the ‘Tibetan Colony’. 
The different representations from different actors 
discussed above has shaped the group’s sense of belonging 
and identity. The events mentioned above get intertwined 
with the everyday of the Khache in Srinagar in such a 
manner that poses some important questions towards 
the state’s way of functioning. Even the state seems to be 
perplexed; giving them permanent ration cards during 
a certain period and then stopping their passports at 
another. It seems like sometimes the global identity of the 
Tibetan being a refugee gets ‘projected’ on this community 
situated in Kashmir. These different categories percolate 
into the community as they form groups like the Tibetan 
Muslim Youth Federation (TMYF) and the Sangeen Youth 
Federation (SYF), with the former perceived to have an 
attachment with Tibetan identity and the latter towards 
Kashmiri identity. The two groups’ differing views are 
not in terms of history but in terms of the contemporary. 
Respondents from both parties agreed to the importance 
of their Tibetan heritage and their relation with their king, 
the 14th Dalai Lama. But the problem lies at present where 
due to unemployment and lack of better livelihood oppor-
tunities, there are frequent differences between the two 
groups. The underlying tensions between the TMYF and 
the SYF took the form of violence in 2012, which will be 
discussed in the section that follows. It shows the current 
messy state of the groups. 
Crisis of Identity and Belonging: the Tibetan Public 
School
The Tibetan Public School (TPS) is located in the ‘Tibetan 
Colony’ at Badamwari, Hawal in Srinagar. The School is 
recognized and affiliated with the Jammu and Kashmir 
State Board of School Education. The Jammu and Kashmir 
state acknowledges the community’s presence visibly, only 
during the multiple visits of the Dalai Lama. The projection 
of the Tibetan identity through such exchanges is what 
some members of the SYF group fear. Another predom-
inant fear that exists is that of being called a refugee 
through the affiliation with the CTA, which would hinder 
their chances of becoming a state subject. Individuals who 
oppose this relationship with the 14th Dalai Lama and 
the CTA perceive themselves as Kashmiri. Thus, when the 
community’s identity is being constructed as Tibetan, it 
disturbs some members’ notion of the self. Following the 
same line of thought one of my respondents mentioned, 
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“We have a fear that as the naming of the school changed 
from Tibetan Muslim Children’s Educational Institute to 
Tibetan Public School, in the same way, we would also one 
day become a refugee.” 
On the first visit of the Dalai Lama in 1975, the Tibetan 
Muslim Refugee Welfare Association was formed which 
looked after the well-being of the community. When 
in Srinagar, “some elderly people started imparting 
education and formed an Educational Committee to run 
the Madrasa Islamia Tibetan at Id-Gah, Srinagar.” It was 
through the financial assistance from the Dalai Lama and 
from the Tibet Fund, New York, that “a handicraft center, 
a co-operative shop and a school were established”. 6 
At present however, only the school exists. The TMYF 
was formed after the Tibetan Muslim Refugee Welfare 
Association and it took over the school’s management 
after the winter break of 1997. The school developed from 
a small rented building at Baripora to a three-storied 
building near one of the colonies. It is largely the funding 
and possibly the monetary gains received by few that has 
created rifts among the community members. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the topic, the intricacies involved and 
the confidence in which my respondents shared things 
with me, I will not be able to go into certain specific details 
with regards to the TPS and their funding, but I will try to 
give the readers an idea about the situation.
Apart from CTA, the school also received some funds 
from the Mongolian Tibetan Affairs Commission, Taipei. 
It is unclear about what happened to the funding from 
Taiwan, but it is believed to have stopped after the school 
management committee (TMYF) sent them an official 
letter informing them of the transfer of the manage-
ment on March 1st 1997. Further, explaining the Taiwan 
connection one of the respondents mentioned, “In search 
of better opportunities many people from the community 
went to Taiwan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and through these 
movements worked and also formed connections with the 
Taiwanese Government.” Additionally, he believed that 
the community, which was separated in the early days 
because of the Taiwan government, was further separated 
by the involvement of the CTA. A new unidentified group 
was formed, but in local parlance, the community refers to 
them as the ‘Kashmir group’, which did not believe in the 
ideology of the two already existing groups (Dharamshala 
and Taiwan). This group was working towards gaining 
‘Jammu and Kashmir state subjectship’ for the whole of 
the community. From this unidentified group emerged 
the youth wing SYF. All of the members of the commu-
nity largely know the presence of the three groups in the 
community. In the local reference, the groups represent 
a certain geographical undertone. They are referred to as 
the Dharamshala, Taiwan and Kashmir groups. The indi-
vidual forms one’s identity through the social interactions 
and the relations that one witnesses (Heise and MacKinnon 
2010). The social interaction with the CTA and the relation 
with the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, possibly led to 
the division of the community.
 My fieldwork discussions often revolved around the 
tensions that were already brewing in the community 
with regards to the divided status of being clubbed into 
various categories. These worries came to the surface 
during the two-day visit of the Dalai Lama in 2012 at 
the TPS, when the school was vandalized. This incident 
brought forth the tensions that have been present in the 
community since the time the school had started taking 
funds. The act of violence on the members of the manage-
ment of the school and the school itself can be seen as the 
result of the concerns resulting from different categoriza-
tions. Further, it becomes essential to look at the political 
role of the CTA and how it has affected the community. 
The process of being a Tibetan and preserving one’s iden-
tity, which began in 1975 (the first visit of the Dalai Lama), 
had its effect to such an extent that the anxieties present 
within the community escalated and found an expression 
in his third visit to the community. The violence against 
the TPS is itself a representation of the violence against 
the Tibetan identity that some community members 
hold close and some who do not want to adhere to. The 
‘primary’ respondents of two different groups have voiced 
their opinions as to how the incident unfolded, which 
have been mentioned below.
Some members of the Khache community believes that 
the Dharamshala group handles the management of 
the school, while the Kashmir and Taiwanese groups 
are perceived as having joined hands to overthrow the 
Dharamshala group. In the given account the respondent 
referred to both Kashmir and Taiwan groups as ‘they’: 
The incident took place after the Tibetan Parlia-
ment Speaker spoke. Some group of the people 
started vandalizing the school building, and they 
called the police. They misled the police and in 
the end, captured the management of the school. 
Everyone knew I was looking after the academic 
programme here, and hence I was taken into police 
custody. But I called the Private Secretary of His 
Holiness, and I was not harmed at all. 
Next, the Divisional Commissioner started the 
enquiry. We took the matter till the high court 
because they had bribed the tehsildars. During that 
time the jurisdiction summoned some of our man-
agement members claiming that we have stolen 
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control of the school and if you do not leave the 
school in a week’s time then the case will be han-
dled legally. (Rahim Khan, 47, Male, Tibetan Public 
School, 17th September 2015) 
A respondent from another group (Kashmir and Taiwan) 
observed: 
Everyone from the community was attending the 
cultural programme in the school. The violence 
broke out when someone from SYF questioned the 
school management to show documents about how 
the funds are disbursed in the school. Basically 
what we wanted was transparency. As they refused 
to reveal the records, arguments started. Next, 
some people who were present began breaking 
doors and windowpanes of the school. To resolve 
this dispute, the Additional Deputy Commissioner 
headed a committee. I reached along with some 
members on behalf of the SYF, and we explained 
our stance that we were not refugees, we were 
citizens, they maintained that they were Tibetan 
refugees, they were related to the Dalai Lama. 
The Additional Deputy Commissioner passed on the 
responsibility to the tehsildar [tax officers accom-
panied with revenue inspectors], who proposed 
a community referendum be affected, and who-
ever gained the majority of the votes would take 
authority of the school. It was then that these 
(Dharamshala) people went to the High Court, 
obtained a stay order, and slapped a case for me. 
They do not want to vote because then the school 
would come in the hands of the community. And I 
did not go ahead because there is nobody here to 
take responsibility for the school. If tomorrow the 
quality of the school falls, it will only be bad for the 
community, so it is better to stay like this. I have no 
personal end to seek here; I do not have livelihood 
worries. So, I just let it be. (Naseer Shah, 50, Male, 
Hawal, 10th August 2015)
In the two narratives, one can see how the incident is seen 
from two different perspectives. Recalling what happened 
further, the second respondent said, “After the incident 
took place, the Dharamshala speaker of the parliament 
called me and had an interaction with me, he said that you 
are so weak that even after having citizenship, you are 
asking for assistance from us, refugees.” For the second 
respondent, it further heightened the distinction of being 
different from the Tibetan, thus projecting another group.
As the community needed help, they took aid from 
whomever they received it, not realizing the consequences 
it might have for the community later. Summing up these 
chaotic encounters for survival of the group in Kashmir, 
one of my respondents questioned the very nature of how 
categories are produced:
One has to be well sustained in life for ordinary 
men to think about humanity. When we repatriated 
here, we did not have any job, no proper livelihood, 
people were anxious. I heard that aids were coming 
for the community from Dharamshala and Taiwan. 
Some people among us opposed the idea of accept-
ing funds and some did not. (Gulam Rasul, 70, Male, 
Hazratbal, 13th August)
Amidst this entire struggle for survival, some members of 
the community tried to achieve a uniform political identity 
addressing all their different categories with—Repatriated 
Indian Muslims of Kashmiri Origin from Tibet in the year 
2005. But amidst the differences in ideological positions 
within the community, this group became defunct within 
a short period. In due course of time, these different 
groups brought along a feeling of bitterness within the 
community members, and their unresolved issues resulted 
in violence as encountered above. The only thing that 
has somewhat remained stable (though evolving through 
different regions) in their messy states, is their religion, 
which ultimately forms a major part of their survival, 
existence, and everyday lives. 
Hijrat: Narrative of Belonging in Movement 
“Hum hijrat karke yahaan aye (We have performed hijrat 
and travelled here)” (Saleema Sheikh, 60, Female, Hawal, 
1st September 2015) 
Most narratives began with the reference of hijrat—the 
emblematic religious migration—as a faithful act in itself 
(in this case, escaping a religion-intolerant political space 
in post-1950s Tibet). “Apne din ki hifazat karo (Learn to 
protect your religion).” The larger historical and cultural 
context of hijrat by the Prophet of Islam was frequently 
invoked by respondents to locate their migration and the 
circumstances under which they migrated. “Ab wahi baat 
hai, hum log hijrat karke aye hain (It is the same story, we 
have undertaken hijrat and we have come here).” Thus, 
the notion of hijrat has become a signifying factor in the 
everyday life of the community. 
Another respondent, who was 60 then, owns a shop in the 
Tibetan Colony and used the same phrase to respond to 
the query on why they moved from Tibet. In his words: 
“Hum hijrat karke yahaan aye (We have undertaken hijrat 
and have come here).” He explained that as there was 
no freedom of religion in Tibet in the 1960s, they left 
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the place and moved to save their religion. It is hijrat as 
a concept, which is used by the people to make sense 
of having been protected from any eventuality. Talking 
about the recent floods in Kashmir in 2014 and the Nepal 
earthquake in 2015, one of my respondents mentioned: 
Even prophet Muhammad had to do hijrat to save 
Islam. And the person who does hijrat will be saved 
from any unforeseen circumstances. Look at the 
recent floods that happened in Srinagar, did any 
of our community people suffer? Also, during the 
Nepal earthquake, lots of people were killed. Did 
anything happen to our community members? No, 
it is because we did hijrat, that Allah has saved us 
from such natural disasters. 
Such was the insistence on the movement to save reli-
gion that the first mosque built was named as ‘The Hijrat 
Mosque’, in the EidGah Colony, which is locally referred to 
as the ‘Tibetian Refugee Colony’. During the initial years 
after having relocated to Srinagar, an imam from Nadwa 
Ulama, (an Islamic Institution in Lucknow formally called 
Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama) came and reminded the 
people that they must never forget that they had come 
(to Srinagar) to save their religion. There is a possibility 
that the only thing that has remained constant for them 
is their religion and that is what significantly shapes their 
sense of belonging. Further, the acceptance and invocation 
of the Islamic concept of hijrat allows the community to 
see migration as not just an external event, but a sort of 
spiritual journey. At present, it would not be surprising to 
see members of the family going to the Tablighi Jamaat, a 
preaching movement reaffirming basic principles of Islam, 
for days or even months. 
Thus, we see people bring up hijrat as an idea that helps 
them cope. Further, it validates their movement from 
Tibet to their ancestral land of Kashmir. Their networks 
that span across different regions find resonance in the 
use of this concept to make sense of their uncertainty. 
The core doctrine of hijrat is the idea of preserving 
one’s religion resulting in the ultimate act of faith and 
sincerity towards Islam (Casewitt 1998: 114). However, 
such geographical movements always put their own 
pulls and pressures for change. Many practices that were 
adopted in Tibet were stopped without any explanation 
(Gaute 2015: 53). Religion which seemed the only thing 
that was constant for this group has also evolved through 
the local and global influences. Although the veneration 
and celebration of Sufi saints is a widespread practice in 
Kashmir, but it seems that the Khache have given up this 
traditional practice in pursuit of forging a new identity for 
the community.
Conclusion 
“Do not try to separate the fabrics of the cloth, everything 
will fall apart.” (Gulam Rasul, 70, Male, Hazratbal, 21st 
August 2015)
When I first entered the Hawal colony, a big worn-out gate 
welcomed me. It was called Sangeen Darwaza. Identical 
houses lined together, but some had more levels than the 
others, perhaps an indication of the social class of the 
particular tenant. The geography was similar to other 
neighborhoods of Srinagar, but on closer inspection, you 
would find kids sitting on the roadside, chattering in 
Tibetan, while using some Kashmiri words in between. 
Young women walked past me in groups, wearing salwar 
kameez, giggling; an old woman sat on the threshold, 
enjoying the sun. She was wearing a chuba. 
Entering the house of my hosts, Khatiza Kharmurah, an 
80-year-old woman welcomed me in. She was wearing a 
chuba and a headscarf. Walking barefoot on the wooden 
floor, lined heavily with carpets of Tibetan wool, we sat 
down while lunch was being spread out in the adjacent 
dining room. As we were sitting and waiting, sipping butter 
tea, I asked, “Khatiza la, (don’t you feel hot in) chuba?” She 
smiled and replied, “Yeh toh hamara traditional dress hain 
na, Tibetan honey ka nishani (This is our traditional dress, 
a marker of us being Tibetan).” Perhaps the chuba and the 
headscarf were her ways of keeping Tibet alive in everyday 
life in Kashmir—the Tibet where she grew up, was being 
embodied and lived with here in Srinagar, I wondered. 
Lunch was served. As we both walked into the wooden 
dining room, the sumptuous spread caught my eyes. The 
fumes of wazwaan (multi-course meal in Kashmiri cuisine) 
mixed seamlessly with that of thukpa (Tibetan noodle soup) 
and momo (dumplings) in the early autumn afternoon air. 
How does one write about everyday lives that are so 
complex and connected? Regions, regimes, religion, 
narratives of belonging, politics, self, identity, mingling 
like smoke in the afternoon air. Where does one end and 
the other begin? Everyday life itself is an art of existing, 
encounters with categories, messy negotiations, and 
adjustments made with one’s surroundings. As Anna Tsing 
(2005) would describe, and as we have seen in our case, 
region, religion, routines, and rules are themselves co-pro-
duced through these encounters, which ultimately shape 
the everyday identities and practices. There is no clear 
demarcation between these categories which themselves 
are not fixed, but in movement, as has become clear (or 
perhaps, unclear?) through various elaborations in the 
article. This makes neat categorization impossible. Calling 
them Tibetan may deny the performed aspirations of being 
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Kashmiri, claims to an ancestry, and sense of history, if not 
access to possibilities of dignified livelihood. At the same 
time, calling them Kashmiri may possibly deny a cherished 
Tibet, that is remembered, imagined, and performed in 
everyday food, language, gestures, and habits and maybe 
even aspired. The Khache may be Kashmiri, may be Tibetan, 
may be both or none, perhaps even everything, living here 
in Srinagar, or there in Lhasa, or in Nepal, Kalimpong, 
Darjeeling maintaining an ummah across regions and 
regimes. Words have the capacity to make worlds as they 
move across different time and space (Gluck and Tsing 
2009: 3). Further, words move, pick up new meanings, 
histories, and stories. As such, as I have argued, perhaps a 
geographically and politically neutral term Khache is less 
problematic for representation. Khache is less loaded, due 
to its non-association with any particular center of power, 
as such it is perhaps more open to movement, change 
and more nuanced representation, affects, respectful of 
trans-national agencies of ‘staying together’. 
I need to make two admissions before I end. Firstly, I 
acknowledge that there are not enough voices of women 
in the article, as I would have preferred. The question of 
gender in the above discussions of representation and 
language is an important one and will be the subject of 
my forthcoming articles. Secondly, the journey of writing 
this article has been intensely personal and stressful. 
Most of the respondents I quote above are relatives and 
acquaintances who represent a wide spectrum of opinions 
and positions on these issues. As an ethnographer, a young 
unmarried female, I have tried my best to search, hear, and 
gather from the widest range of stories possible and have 
made a careful and honest attempt to assemble my own 
understanding of reality. Yet, as one who can publish her 
own representation, words that may reach far and wide, I 
put myself in a position of privilege and peril. 
  * * *
In the meantime, five years have passed since I have 
seen my childhood friend, who we met at the start of 
this article. He has a shop now on the 10th Mile Road 
in Kalimpong on the lower end, where probably many 
traders used to visit in the earlier days. I am in Kalimpong 
again. As he sees me coming, my friend gets up, and we 
share a cordial handshake of being old classmates. I tell 
him how much I miss the place and am thinking of coming 
back for good. We discuss business, friends (who moved 
away and some who stayed back), talked about everything 
under the sun. And next followed a conversation some-
thing like this:
Me: Do you remember what I had asked you when we were small?
Friend: No. Indeed it has been long. Hey, was it about the Losar 
thing or Tibetan Muslim?
Me: (With a smile in my face) Yes, you do remember. I have a 
better idea now. Let me start by telling you about the history of 
my community.
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Endnotes
1. The Dunhuang Manuscripts are important religious 
and secular documents that were discovered in the 
Mogao Caves, in the twentieth century. This manuscript 
consists of important works on ranging from history and 
mathematics to folk songs and dance. For more details: 
http://idp.bl.uk.
2.  This was iterated many times by the elders of the 
community who gave many anecdotes like: ‘One of the 
Poonj, (usually five members) decided to go to Kashmir as 
he had some relatives in Ladhakh.’ 
3. I came across this newspaper article and the associated 
quotations through Atwill (2016). Though, I was not able to 
get access for this original newspaper article, the reference 
is: 1959. India’s Traders Held by Chinese: New Delhi Says 
Reds Detain Five in Tibet and Prevent Hundreds from 
Returning. New York Times, 12 August 1959.
4. In White Paper I, the two Notes that specifically talked 
about the treatment of the group as Indian Nationals or 
Tibetans are: Letter from the Consul-General of India 
in Lhasa to the Foreign Bureau in Tibet, 13 May 1959 
and Letter from the Director of the Foreign Bureau in 
Tibet to the Consul-General of India in Lhasa, 17 July 
1959. Similarly, in White Paper II there were two notes 
specifically on this issue: Note given by the Ministry of 
External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in 
India, 24 September 1959 and Note given by the Ministry 
of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in 
India, 29 October 1959. 
5.  The names of my respondents have been changed for 
their protection. 
6. This information has been retrieved from the 
document that was shared by some members from 
the community, which outlined a brief history of the 
school titled ‘Tibetan School in Srinagar under Different 
Managements since 1960s’. 
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